COUNTERMOVEMENTS AND CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY U.S.

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INTRODUCTION

Research on social movements continues to be a vigorous and theoretically significant field. Marx & Wood's review article (1975) indicated the growth of research on leftist movements, such as the civil rights, anti-war, women's, and student movements. Since then countermovements have arisen to oppose these movements. This development has sparked new research into the antibusing, Stop-ERA, right-to-life, and conservative religious movements.

Here I consider research only on movements in the United States, focusing on literature published after 1970. For the pre-1970 period, Lipset & Raab's *The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism in America* (1978) provides a comprehensive summary. In this review I concentrate on conservative rather than extremist right-wing groups, and thus depart from the emphasis of previous research. There is little social science literature about today's extreme right, such as paramilitary, National Socialist, and Ku Klux Klan groups (Mars 1977; Anti-Defamation League 1978a,b). Historians, however, have analyzed similar groups that flourished during 1920 and 1940 (Ribuffo 1974; Degler 1965).

Social science research can help to resolve a number of questions about conservative movements in contemporary America. How adequate are existing theories? In section 1 I evaluate theories about status and politics, which analyze past right-wing phenomena such as McCarthyism and the John Birch Society. Are these theories applicable to the "new right?" In section 2 I ask what types of people support the right-to-life, Stop-ERA, and antibusing movements. How much does the public support these movements? The strength of conservative movements might stem not from popular approval but
from movement organization and ties to governmental or other elites. In section 3 I examine the environment of conservative movements and focus on a particular type of conservative movement, the countermovement, which mobilizes against another social movement. Another possible source of strength for conservative movements is conservative Protestantism. In section 4 I explore the complex relation between theological and political conservatism. In section 5 I investigate the degree of unity among contemporary right-wing groups in the United States. Do conservative movements, countermovements, and theological conservatives share leaders, linkages, and constituencies?

1. THEORIES OF STATUS PRESERVATISM, STATUS SYMBOLISM, AND STATUS DISCREPANCY

Definitions

Writers have used the terms “the new right,” “anti-movements,” “neo-conservatism,” the “radical right,” and “countermovements” in confusing and often inconsistent ways (Nash 1979: xvi; Rossiter 1962: 3–19). Here I define right-wing movements as social movements whose stated goals are to maintain structures of order, status, honor, or traditional social differences or values. Right-wing movements sometimes directly advocate, and usually cause, the perpetuation or increase of economic or political inequalities. The right may be contrasted with the left, which seeks greater equality or political participation.

Right-wing movements may be divided into extremist, conservative, and radical right movements. Lipset & Raab (1978: 3–31) focus attention on a minority within the right, extremist groups whose defining characteristics are intolerance, monism, moralism, and preoccupation with conspiracies. Hofstadter (1964) distinguishes between conservative movements, which preserve long-standing institutions and values through minimizing reforms, and “pseudo-conservatives” or the radical right, which favors drastic changes in the status quo to enact right-wing principles. Most of the movements considered here are conservative rather than extremist or radical.

Past students of the right wing have developed several important theories about status and politics. Criticisms of the best known of these theories, Lipset & Raab’s (1978) concept of status preservatism, lead to a crucial question: Are the criticisms specific to Lipset & Raab’s version of status politics, or do they apply to other theories of status and politics?

Status Preservatism

Lipset’s theory derives from an exhaustive study of the history of right-wing extremist movements in the United States, from the Anti-Masons and the
Know Nothing Movements before the Civil War to the John Birch Society and the campaigns of George Wallace. According to Lipset & Raab’s (1978: 29, 460–77, 485) notion of status preservatism, declining groups seek to maintain their eroding status by strengthening or creating identifications with groups prestigious in the past. This excessive dwelling on the past (“Quondam Complex”) is characteristic of persons who have lost their group attachments and identities. These persons give their support to right-wing leaders who expose bigotry and spin conspiracy theories and other irrationalities.

Lipset’s major contribution is to link empirical research about the right to major theories about political stability and modernization. Lipset’s (1960, 1964, 1981) analysis of right-wing movements is part of his broader concern with the legitimacy, effectiveness, and stability of regimes, particularly democratic states. According to Lipset & Rabb (1978: 486–87), right-wing extremism is frequently associated with political breakdown—the collapse of dominant parties, the increase in political conflict, and the lack of regard for political rules of the game, particularly among the lower SES. A concern with political stability allows Lipset (1980; Lipset & Raab 1981) to provide a useful perspective on the new right: that the right is currently not a threat to democratic processes and is less influential than popularly assumed. However, at other times, Lipset & Raab are too quick to link the right with the breakdown of social structures and groups. Sometimes Lipset & Raab (1978: 487) imply that alienated, frustrated, and anomic individuals produce mass mobilization in extremist movements of the right. The notion that extremist movements stem from social breakdown has been criticized by many researchers (Tilly 1978: 18–24; Useem 1980; see section 2, below). A group may experience relative decline in status and yet still possess networks and organization that can be mobilized in collective action.

Another contribution is Lipset’s elaboration of the view that the right is a form of anti-modernist culture, which opposes the consequences of economic growth and bureaucratic rationality—self-gratification, equality, secularism, and a loosening of traditional restraints. This classification of diverse cultural developments yields a theory useful for drawing comparisons with European fascism and the contemporary right in France (Lipset 1980, 1981:488–503). However, classifying cultural developments sometimes leads to the loss of detail and nuance important in the analysis of belief systems.

At times, Lipset’s focus on the societal and global level leads to the lack of elaboration of sectoral and institutional ideologies. For example, Lipset & Raab’s theory of status preservation places only secondary importance on the particular ideology a threatened group adopts; the theory does not treat values or religious or racial beliefs as causal factors. Ideologies, according to Lipset & Raab (1978: 340, 392, 472, 490, 537), are epiphenomenal because they are constantly present and only become important when status erosion occurs.
causal factor is the desire to preserve status, which leads groups to identify with the past. Religion and bigotry are the “cultural baggage” of that identification. Furthermore, Lipset & Raab (1978: 156, 223) argue that the ideologies associated with status preservatism are becoming increasingly abstract. Status decline now produces the general ideologies of Americanism, nationalism, and patriotism rather than attachments to specific groups. For Lipset & Raab, many ideologies will suffice to express the underlying urge for status preservatism. Other writers, as we shall see, have argued that ideologies are not substitutes, but rather are symbols of underlying social changes.

Are these criticisms of Lipset applicable to other major theories of status and politics—e.g. Bell et al.’s analysis of the radical right, Gusfield’s theory of status symbolism, or theories of status discrepancy?

Status Politics Theory: Origins and Critiques

Lipset & Raab’s concept of status preservatism was only one of the many theories of status and politics that evolved from research in the 1950s into McCarthyism and other right-wing movements. The Radical Right (Bell 1964), which featured essays by Parsons, Glazer, Riesman, and Lipset, and Hofstadter’s The Paranoid Style in American Politics (1967) were widely acclaimed, and established major theories that dominated postwar social science. These authors argued that McCarthy’s supporters were either falling in status (e.g. small town, old family Protestants) or rising in status (immigrant groups anxious to demonstrate their “Americanism”). The empirical findings were woven into a complex pattern of historical parallels, analyses of style and mood, international comparisons, groundings in economic changes, and implications for politics and public policy. The style of these theoretical essays deserves emulation today.

The essays have been criticized for emphasizing mass mobilization rather than movement organization (Turner 1958:463–64). Michael Regin’s (1967) attack on Bell (1964) and others foreshadowed resource mobilization theorists, who challenge the notion that breakdown and mass mobilization produce movements. Regin argued that McCarthyism was the product of local elites and not mass sentiments, that political participation in social movements is neither irrational nor demagogic, and that political institutions can cause rather than restrain extremism (see also Gusfield 1962). McCarthy skillfully used access to institutions (his position as chair of a Senate subcommittee, his ability to create news) to increase his following (Rogin 1967: 248–60). Regin’s incisive critique of pluralist approaches to social movements reflected a revived interest in participatory democracy, sparked by the left-wing movements of the 1960s. But despite their theoretical differences, Lipset and Regin agree that McCarthy’s support was mainly among Republicans and economic conservatives rather than Populist or mass constituencies (Lipset & Raab 1978: 232–33, 235, 246).
Rogin’s agrument that McCarthyism was the product of local elites still leaves us with a question: Besides rational calculation aimed at achieving Republican electoral victories, what shaped the concerns of these elites? Threatened elites and middle strata are carefully examined in Gusfield’s (1963) work on the temperance movement in the United States. Both criticizing and elaborating upon early status-politics theory, Gusfield’s work deserves recognition as an analytically distinct theory—status symbolism.

**Status Symbolism**

Gusfield (1963: 19–20, 178–80) criticized Lipset’s and Hofstadter’s early writings for overemphasizing the expressive features of status movements—the participants’ need for cathartic release, their irrationality, their expression of personality abnormalities, and their search for scapegoats. Gusfield’s (1963: 26–35) analysis of the temperance movement in the United States emphasized that temperance was a symbol of identification with a group’s life-style, desired character traits, and notions about success in life. The conflict between dry and wet was a clash between two cultures—that of the Protestant middle classes versus that of the immigrant workers. The saloon stood for urbanism, political machines, and Catholicism (pp. 98–100).

Gusfield’s concept of status symbolism has inspired a number of important case studies—e.g. Zurcher & Kirkpatrick’s (1976) book about anti-pornography campaigns. Recently, theories of status symbolism have evolved in several promising directions. Gusfield (1978) and Clelland advocate the study of the politics of life-style; Clelland argues that status-oriented movements should be seen as attempts to “build and sustain moral orders” rather than angry responses to declines in status ranking (Page & Clelland 1978). Use of the techniques of cultural anthropology (Geertz 1963), literary analysis (Gusfield 1976), and linguistics (Dittmer 1977) promises to help explain how the symbols and ideology of social movements reflect status concerns.

**Status Discrepancy**

Another analytically distinct theory of status and politics—status discrepancy theory—does not focus on the beliefs and organization of particular movements. The status discrepancy theorists conceptualize status as a quantitative ranking of individuals and examine whether status inconsistency or status changes lead individuals to support right-wing movements. A recent review of this literature by Clelland & Guess (1975: 12) characterizes the findings as “contradictory and inconclusive.” A more general review of literature using status inconsistency as an independent variable finds “quite disparate” results (Wilson & Zurcher 1976: 521). Attempts to correlate status change with support for the right wing have yielded both confirmation (Rohter 1969) and disconfirmation (Wolfinger et al 1964: 277–81; Rogin 1967: 17; Schoenberger 1969: 293–95). On the one hand, Rush (1967) applied Lenski’s model of
status crystallization and concluded that the status discrepant are more likely to advocate right-wing political views (see also Hunt & Cushing 1970). But on the other hand, McEvoy (1969, 1971) found little evidence of a relation between status inconsistency and support for Senator Goldwater. These conflicting results lead Clelland & Guess (1975: 5) to argue that the research on status ranking and status inconsistency has reached “a point of diminishing returns” (cf Wilson & Zurcher 1976: 530, who call for more sophisticated models).

In short, three theories of status and politics have guided much important empirical research. Status-discrepancy theory has produced quantitative studies utilizing survey data. For those studying social movements, this literature is of limited utility because it focuses on general processes of social mobility. It does not explain how different social movements can emerge from status-inconsistent individuals. Theories of status symbolism have produced some exemplary historical case studies focusing on movement leaders and ideology. Theories of status preservatism have led Lipset and others to ask a fundamental question in political sociology: What social groups provide the basis for particular social movements? Using survey and historical data, Lipset & Raab (1978) have impressively documented the social bases of the important right-wing extremist groups in the United States up to 1972. The question remains: What constituencies support the conservative movements of the late 1970s and early 1980s?

2. CONSTITUENCIES OF CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENTS: THE RIGHT-TO-LIFE, STOP-ERA, AND ANTI-BUSING MOVEMENTS

The question of who supports the right has produced much speculation among researchers and journalists. Conservative leaders are confident that the “new right” speaks for a diverse majority (Viguerie 1980).

A major theme of Lipset’s research has been that political-economic conservatism and social conservatism have different constituencies. Lipset & Raab define social conservatism as prejudice against blacks, Jews, and Catholics and a general intolerance of diversity and modernism. Movements of political-economic conservatism oppose the welfare state, governmental regulation, and domestic and international Communism and seek to perpetuate the advantages of business, property owners, and upper-income individuals (e.g. they campaign for the open shop and for reductions in the taxation of capital gains).

Social conservatism is associated with little education and low SES, rural residence, and strong religious commitment. In contrast to social conservatives, political-economic conservatives tend to be highly educated, upper-income Republicans. These two dimensions produce three types of right
wingers—the Old Guard (economically conservative but socially liberal), socially conservative workers (who are economically progressive), and consistent conservatives on both dimensions (Lipset & Raab 1978: 428–77).

Lipset’s research on conservative constituencies has been challenged by Richard Hamilton (1972, 1975), who argued that Lipset overemphasized the prejudice among the working class, particularly outside the South. Hamilton further claimed that the appeal of political-economic conservatism does not extend into the broad reaches of the middle strata or independent business, but rather is restricted to the Protestant and upper-income part of the middle class. Since most of Hamilton’s data were gathered before 1970, we still do not know whether the currently emerging social conservatism movements follows the pattern described by Lipset or that asserted by his critics.

Another limitation of research on right-wing constituencies is that the strength of conservative movements may result not from public support but from movement organization and linkages to elites. Rogin, as we have seen, emphasizes how political institutions and local elites create right-wing movements. Turner & Killian’s (1972:247) criticisms of simple “grass roots” approaches to studying movements also suggest a focus on organizational processes. The strongest proponents of studying movement organization are resource-mobilization theorists, who argue that popular sentiments are not sufficient to generate social movements and that movement leaders can create rather than merely express discontent (McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977). Mottl (1980: 625) points out that resource-mobilization theory might be particularly applicable to conservative movements. Conservative movements, which often defend vested interests (Turner & Killian 1972: 317), frequently have ties to elites, organized interests, or institutions.

In short, the strength of conservative movements since 1970 could stem from the political-economic and/or social conservatives demarcated by Lipset or from movement organization and linkages. Below I consider the evidence on three conservative movements—the right-to-life movement, the anti-ERA movement, and the anti-busing movement.

**The Right-to-Life Movement**

While much of the public opinion literature on attitudes toward abortion is in accord with Lipset’s model of social conservatism, a full explanation of the right-to-life movement must take into account the organization of the movement and the increased salience of religious and family issues among social conservatives. Since 1960, opinion polls have indicated that the opponents of abortion were disproportionately drawn from many of the same constituencies that, according to Lipset & Raab (1978: 44–49), were intolerant of differences—the less-educated, manual workers, low income earners, small town dwellers, Catholics, the religiously committed, and members of conser-
ervative and fundamentalist churches (Petersen & Mauss 1976; Mileti & Barnett 1972; Clayton & Tolone 1973; Finner & Gamache 1969). Blake (1971) adds that women disproportionately opposed abortion and hypothesizes that women who are against abortion obtain satisfaction from family life and seek the government’s recognition of their role in society. Other researchers, however, argue that demographic variables are not useful predictors of attitudes about abortion. Using values, attitudes, and beliefs as independent variables, Granberg (1978, 1980) argues that the opponents to abortion have high religious commitment, favor large families, and have conservative views on sexual morality.

While Lipset’s notion of social conservatism is useful in explaining public opinion about abortion, the theory cannot completely explain the rise of the right-to-life movement. After the Supreme Court decision in 1973 legalizing most abortions, less than 10% of the public opposed all forms of abortion (Tedrow & Mahoney 1979; Arney & Trescher 1976). But the decision dramatically increased the mobilization of the right-to-life movement. According to Blake & Del Pinal (1981), the majority of the public favors abortions only in some circumstances, and the beliefs and backgrounds of this majority are similar to those of the minority who oppose all abortions.

In addition to public opinion, researchers should study the participants, leadership, and organization of the right-to-life movement. An important forthcoming book by Kristin Luker (at the University of California, San Diego) relates activism in the right-to-life movement to attitudes toward family, children, career, and to beliefs about when a human life begins. Neitz (1980) suggests that the rank and file participants in anti-abortion movements have a general pro-family orientation, which also leads to opposition to extramarital sex, pornography, and sex on television. The leadership of the movement, heavily influenced by the Catholic Church hierarchy, has a general “pro-life” position, associated with concerns for world peace and social justice. Other literature on the leadership of the right-to-life movement also strongly emphasizes the involvement of the Catholic Church. Catholic leaders frequently spoke out against abortion (Steinhoff & Diamond 1977) and organized pro-life committees in local parishes (Lader 1973: 69, 138, 178). Contributions solicited on Catholic Church grounds provided over one half of the budget for the National Committee for a Human Life Amendment and the New York State Right to Life Committee during 1976 and 1972 (Jaffe 1981: 77, 81).

In short, polls indicate that opposition to all forms of abortion is limited to less than 10% of the public, concentrated among the social conservatives described by Lipset. Rather than the level of public support, the key issue seems to be how activists’ concerns about family, sexuality, and religion combine with the organizational facilities of Catholic and other churches to produce movement mobilization.
The Stop-ERA Movement

Like the right-to-life movement, the Stop-ERA (Stop-Equal-Rights-Amendment) movement is supported by only a minority of public opinion. The strength of the movement also seems to depend upon elite support and the activists’ beliefs about religion and the family, which generate intense commitment.

While research on the right-to-life movement has focused on public opinion and has indicated similarities between anti-abortion opinions and social conservatism, research on the anti-ERA movement has focused on movement activists and has noted their affinities with political and economic conservatism. Tedin et al (1977) interviewed Texas anti-ERA activists and concludes that they (compared to pro-ERA activists) believed in radical right political ideology, described themselves as politically conservative, were housewives and church members, and had high religious commitment. Similarly, other studies find anti-ERA sentiment associated with political conservatism, religious commitment, membership in fundamentalist and conservative denominations, localistic orientation, rural background, upward mobility, and housewife status (Mueller & Dimieri 1980: 5; Brady & Tedin 1976: 572; Arrington & Kyle 1978). The prominence of radical right views is related to the organizing efforts of Phyllis Shlafly, a prominent Goldwater Republican and founder of the Stop-ERA organization. One third of the people lobbying the Oklahoma legislature against ERA received Shlafly’s newsletter (Brown 1979: 14; Boles 1979:67–68).

In the Stop-ERA movement, political-economic conservatives lead a socially conservative movement, thus exemplifying an alliance characteristic of the “new right” (Lipset & Raab 1978: 473). However, divisions exist between the activists and those in the general public who oppose ERA. In contrast to anti-ERA activists, voters against the ERA in a Massachusetts referendum did not advocate a general right-wing or anti-feminist perspective. Anti-ERA voters supported equal pay for equal work, were neutral on expanding day care, and slightly favored legalized abortion (Mueller & Dimieri 1980).

The Anti-busing Movement

An obvious explanation for the anti-busing movement is racial prejudice, disproportionately found among low-SES, Southern, and rural constituencies. However, a curious problem remains. While overt racial prejudice is confined to a small, declining minority of the population (Ladd & Lipset 1980: 60–61), a powerful anti-busing movement has arisen that enjoys the support of about four fifths of the white population (Sears et al 1979: 371). Recent research discusses several explanations for the power and popularity of the anti-busing movement—community organization, self-interest, and backlash.

Explicitly guided by resource-mobilization theory, much research has fo-
cused on how the strength of the anti-busing movement depends on community organization and leadership. Useem (1980) argues that participation in the anti-busing movement in Boston was not related to measures of social disorganization but rather to prior organization—individuals’ feelings of attachment to the neighborhood and active participation in politics and personal networks in the community. Similarly, Weatherford (1978) criticizes portrayals of anti-busing movements as mass irrationality and argues that the anti-busing movement in Los Angeles stemmed instead from careful organization, alliance formation, and reasonable perceptions of specific grievances. During the controversies over busing in Boston, Los Angeles, and Richmond, California, civic and neighborhood groups such as the PTA and the Home and School association converted into chapters of anti-busing movements. Neighborhood newspapers, radio personalities, and businessmen gave further organized support. Movements often rallied around charismatic local and state office holders (Rubin 1972: 132–35; Raffel 1980: 158).

A further anti-busing constituency could be parents whose children are adversely effected by busing. However, Sears et al (1979) argues that personal involvement in busing (i.e. having school-age children and residing where busing was occurring or was planned) was not significantly correlated with anti-busing sentiment (see also Gatlin et al 1978). Since only 13% of a national sample were personally involved in school busing for integration, personal involvement cannot be an explanation for the widespread opposition.

From their findings about parents’ personal involvement in school busing, Sears and Gatlin both draw a very general conclusion—that self-interest is not the source of anti-busing attitudes. However, other researchers have argued that interests can indeed explain the widespread opposition to busing. These researchers define interests not as the self-interest of an individual but rather as the broad interests of a group or a social class. Stressing social class, Rubin (1972) argues that anti-integration protests in Richmond, California, stemmed from adverse economic conditions and powerlessness among the working and lower-middle classes. These people displaced their frustrations onto blacks and wanted the schools to express their values rather than the concerns of professional elites. Further elaborating on the importance of class factors, Giles et al (1976) argues that upper-SES protests against school integration are correlated with class prejudice rather than racial prejudice. A promising area for future study will be how different class interests effect anti-busing movements. Future research could also examine the conflicts between middle-class and working-class factions of anti-busing movements (J. Wrigley, UCLA, in preparation).

Others have argued that anti-busing sentiments are grounded not in class related attitudes, but rather in attitudes about racial groups. Distinguishing
bigotry from backlash, let us define bigotry as the opposition to social contact with blacks, the belief in hostile racial stereotypes, and the support for overt discrimination and segregation; let us define backlash as the opposition to quotas, affirmative action, or other policies that have allegedly produced overly rapid advancement for blacks and have eroded the values of liberty and individual achievement (Lipset & Schneider 1978, Ladd & Lipset 1980: 79). Describing a similar dichotomy, McConahay & Hough (1976) use the terms redneck racism and symbolic racism; Wellman (1977) uses the terms prejudice and white racism.

The majority of the US population, which is not bigoted, nevertheless may articulate backlash and, hence, anti-busing sentiment. For example, Useem (1980: 364–365, 366–67) reports that anti-busing sentiment correlated with perceptions that blacks were gaining faster than whites and that blacks had unduly benefitted from favoritism and government programs. Orfield (1978: 109–11) connects the majority sentiment against busing to the majority sentiment that blacks have made some progress, that blacks do not now suffer discrimination in public education, and that blacks’ problems are no longer important.

A sharper distinction between measures of bigotry and measures of backlash could clarify the apparently conflicting findings about the links between racial attitudes and anti-busing sentiment. Kelley (1974) reports slight correlations between anti-busing sentiment and racism variables that measured only bigotry. On the contrary, Sears et al (1979) finds strong correlations between anti-busing sentiment and a scale of racial attitudes that measured both bigotry and backlash. These attitudes correlated with little education, older age, and Southern residence, the same demographics noted by Lipset & Rabb (1978: 433–37).

In short, the right-to-life, Stop-ERA, and anti-busing movements have disproportionate appeal among lower-SES, rural, older, and Southern constituencies that have been socially conservative in the past. The movements have also developed powerful additional support. In addition to racial bigotry, the anti-busing movement utilizes the more widespread backlash sentiments. The appeal of the right-to-life and Stop-ERA groups is intricately bound with theological conservatism, which is explored in further detail in section 4. The strength of conservative movements stems not only from popular support, but also from the high commitment of volunteer women activists, from community organization (anti-busing movements), and from the leadership of churches (right-to-life movement) and political-economic conservatives (Stop-ERA). These findings suggest that the environment of a social movement—the community, political elites, and particularly, other social movements—is an important arena for investigation.
3. COUNTERMOVEMENT LINKAGES

As we have seen, while status politics was originally a theory about institutions, history, and change, most researchers have tested the theory using public opinion polls—studies of individuals at a particular time (Marx 1969: 246). This section focuses on theories that study social movements at the organizational and societal, rather than the individual, level of analysis.

**Countermovement Interactions**

It is useful to investigate a social movement at the macro level by studying its interactions with other social movements. Thus a countermovement may be defined as a movement mobilized against another social movement (Turner & Killian 1957, 1972: 317). Here I adhere to this restrictive definition, in contrast to the more inclusive notions. Tilly (1975: 505–7), for example, introduces a broader concept when he defines a “reactive” movement as a group’s defensive mobilization against elites or another group.

Mottl (1980: 620) and Zald (1979) define countermovement as opposing not another movement, but rather social change. But actually, like most social movements, countermovements both resist and advocate change. Countermovements such as tax protest movements (Kuttner 1980) react against social changes (higher taxes) but also advocate changes (such as new procedures to make tax increases more difficult). If countermovements are defined merely as movements that resist change, the concept becomes too broad, embracing ecological movements opposing pollution, antiwar movements opposing government-initiated policies, and labor movements opposing changes caused by economic development.

According to the definition I use here, countermovements can be either right-wing or left-wing. In the 20th century United States, as in most other nations, most countermovements have been right-wing.¹ The right-wing movements discussed previously—the right-to-life, Stop-ERA, and anti-busing movements—are countermovements that oppose, respectively, the abortion rights movement, the feminist movement, and the civil rights movement. The following discussion applies primarily to right-wing countermovements.

In a movement-countermovement pair, both must fit the definition of a

¹Left-wing movements have sometimes opposed other movements (e.g. the anti-fascist resistance during World War II and current opponents to the Moral Majority, such as George McGovern’s Citizens for Common Sense). But these left-wing movements are usually reformulations of previous movements that antedated the right-wing movement (i.e. Communist and Socialist parties, McGovern’s campaign for the Presidency in 1972). Thus according to my definition, the Moral Majority is a countermovement, because it arose to oppose left-liberal movements after the McGovern campaign.
social movement. (For definitions, see Turner & Killian 1972: 246; Smelser 1963: 1–22; Marx & Wood 1975: 365–71.) At times, the right-wing opposition is really not a countermovement but an attempt by governmental authorities to control a movement (Smelser 1963: 306–10; Polanyi 1957: 237–48; Mayer 1971; Tilly 1978: 98–142). When the government helps to form a countermovement, the definition I use here stresses that a countermovement must be a social movement with its own mobilized membership, organization, and leadership. Similarly, in a true movement-countermovement pair, the left-wing antagonist must be a social movement and not some other activity. An anti-pornography crusade is not a countermovement, because pornography stems not from a social movement but rather from small businesses. Movements to teach a creationist theory of human origins or to prohibit sex education are not countermovements because the opponents are not social movements but professions.

The definition of a countermovement as part of an interacting pair of movements focuses attention on how the interaction affects the values, goals, and tactics of a countermovement. Attempting to oppose a social movement, a countermovement frequently appeals to the “established myths” of society. But often, especially if the challenging movement is strong, a countermovement’s defense of the established order will adopt parts of the challenging movement’s program (Turner & Killian 1972: 319). For example, Phyllis Shlafly, the leader of Stop ERA, supports women’s rights but opposes the ERA because she believes it reduces women’s rights (Brown 1979). Mueller & Dimieri’s (1980) survey of anti-Era activists reveals that they agreed with the pro-ERA activists that more women should hold professional jobs and that women should receive equal pay for equal work. Similarly, the anti-busing movement in Boston advocated one-way voluntary busing from black neighborhoods, the early demand of the civil rights movement there (Mottl 1980: 624).

Interaction between movement and countermovement may produce convergence not only in values and goals, but also in movement tactics. Confirming this notion is Steinhoff & Diamond’s (1977) account of the conflict over abortion legislation in Hawaii. The authors emphasize that both sides tended to lobby and debate in an ordered, pluralistic fashion, because these tactics were legitimate, tasteful, and effective, especially in a small state like Hawaii. However, a general theory of countermovement tactics must also explain why the right-to-life movement in other situations has resorted to militant, even violent, tactics. Mottl (1980: 628) proposes that militancy is part of the countermovement’s four-stage life cycle: “electoral and intra-institutional resistance to change”; “transformation to militant protest (if goals are blocked)”; and “reinstitutionalization (if the countermovement succeeds) or covert resistance to change (if the countermovement is repressed).”
Countermovements, the State, and Political Economy

In an important series of suggestive hypotheses, Mottl (1980: 622) argues that interaction between movement and countermovement often involves conflicts within government and between different levels of government (Zald 1979; Turner & Killian 1972: 350). Thus while the civil rights movement in Boston sought integration through federal regulation and a state-wide racial balance law, the anti-busing movement opposed integration through local elections to the city council and the board of education. Future studies of countermovements could utilize two important theories of conflicts within the state. Tilly (1978: 230–42) analyzes conflicts between a locality and the central government, in which the latter intervenes and creates new authority relations to help a subordinate but rising local group. As local authorities are undercut and their resources are diverted, elites in the locality organize a countermovement to oppose the reforms imposed by the central government. Following Tilly, Useem (1979: 112–16) describes how mandated busing programs in Boston interfered in localities, dictating administrative procedures and imposing financial burdens. Frustrated local elites then organized the anti-busing movement. Schurmann (1974) relates right-wing movements to government officials who articulate broad ideologies that justify a particular agency’s stance. While Schurmann is mainly concerned with national security policy, Mottl (1980: 631) notes that controversies within the Federal Government over integration policy encouraged local anti-busing movements. In this literature, the government is portrayed not as a passive judge of competing movements and interests but as an active participant. The government can channel resources, confer legitimacy, and provide leadership for a social movement.

The dynamic between movement and countermovement has also been affected by historical changes in the national political economy. Studies of political economy need not assume that social classes are the principal actors. In fact, section 2 indicates that most countermovements are complex mobilizations including different classes, frequently appealing on noneconomic issues. Nor can countermovements be simply related to social stratification. Countermovements sometimes oppose challengers with lower SES (Mottl 1980: 621). But as we have seen, countermovements on socially conservative issues frequently draw support from the lower SES. Stop-ERA activists were less likely than feminists to work in professional and managerial jobs (Mueller & Dimieri 1980: 9; Tedin et al 1977: 399).

The most fruitful approaches emphasize history and political economy without reducing movement-countermovement actors to classes. Lipset & Raab (1978: 485) connect the successive rise of right-wing extremist movements in the United States with broad historical dynamics—frontier farmers challenging eastern elites and clergy after the American Revolution; unskilled
labor threatening craftsmen before the Civil War; the successive waves of 19th century immigration; and urbanization in the early 20th century. Wolfe (1981) correlates the growth of the contemporary right with the successive crises of Cold War liberalism.

Thus, important topics for new research are the organizational linkages and the environment of conservative movements—especially the interaction between movement and countermovement and the relation between countermovements and economy and state. Research along these lines could continue the interplay between social-movements theory and other important branches of sociology—an interplay that has characterized the major works on collective behavior and moved this field into the center of the sociological discipline.

4. CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANTISM: FUNDAMENTALISM, CHRISTIAN ANTI-COMMUNISM, REVITALIZATION MOVEMENTS, AND MORAL REFORM

As we have seen, studies indicate that individuals with high religious commitment, particularly in conservative Protestant churches, are more likely than others to participate in anti-ERA and right-to-life movements. The current revival of enthusiastic religious participation has been compared to the revivals of the 1740s and the 1830s in the United States. Conservative Protestant churches have grown rapidly, compared to the mainline liberal denominations (Kelley 1972; Bibby 1978). Thirty-eight per cent of the population claims to have been “born again” (Gallup Organization 1981: 58).

Theological and Political Conservatism

Conservative Protestants in the 20th century have articulated a pessimistic view of human nature—that all are sinners and can obtain salvation only through faith in God and a personal relationship with Christ. Conservative Protestantism emphasizes converting others to this perspective through evangelism (Quebedeaux 1978: 7). Finally, conservative theology has argued that the Bible should be interpreted literally, rather than as a compilation of myths to be analyzed by the “higher criticism” of liberal theologians.

Kelley (1972, 1978) argues that conservative Protestant churches such as the Southern Baptists, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Seventh Day Adventists have grown because they serve the basic function of religion—“making life meaningful in ultimate terms” and because they demand commitment from members. Researchers generally agree that conservative churches
increase in strength because their members are active, few quit, and the children of members participate. The increase in membership could indicate that conservative churches are self-perpetuating in contrast to the argument that people have been switching from liberal to conservative denominations. Bibby (1978; Bibby & Brinkerhoff 1973) argues that the shift is in fact in the other direction. Roof & Hadaway (1979) argue that people have quit the larger, established denominations to join smaller groups—liberal churches and conservative fringe groups.

The link between theological conservatism and political conservatism is neither simple nor clear. Both Johnson (1967; see also 1964, 1966) and Balswick (1970) claim that theological conservatives are more likely than theological liberals to express conservative attitudes on civil rights, civil liberties, and foreign affairs. Wuthnow (1973) cautions us that most attempts to connect orthodox religious belief with social and political-economic conservatism have met only with mixed success. (One measure of theological conservatism, denomination, was generally correlated with social conservatism.) Furthermore, the revivalism of the 1840s was closely associated with abolitionism, feminism, and other social movements that cannot be classified as conservative (Rifkin & Howard 1979: 139–47).

Theologically conservative churches in the United States have developed several types of political involvement. The Christian anti-communist movement was led by Carl McIntire, Billy James Hargis, Edgar Bundy, Verne Kaub, and Fred Schwartz. Combining fundamentalist theology of the 1930s with the anti-communism of the 1950s, the movement grew rapidly in the 1960s, playing an active role in the Goldwater campaign (Jorstad 1970: 14–17, 42, 61, 83).

The neo-evangelicals expouse majoritarian conservatism, exemplified by Billy Graham and Jerry Falwell (1980; Strober & Tomczak 1979). Neo-evangelist churches include the Southern Baptists (with 13.4 million members in 1981) and the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod.

The literature on Christian anti-communism includes several widely cited articles written in the 1960s (Wolfinger et al 1964; Koeppen 1969). The book-length studies (Claybaugh 1974; Redekop 1968) tend routinely to apply the concepts of status loss and frustration elaborated in the early work of Lipset and others (see Bell 1964). Similarly, the secondary sources about neo-evangelism emphasize its doctrines, leaders, and organizational history (Hadden & Swann 1981; Quebedeaux 1978: 39–75) and contain straightforward summaries of widely known works by Glock and Bellah (Streiker & Strober 1972). These detailed case studies can be used to construct broader theories about social movements. More specifically, I review here theories about the types of social movement organizations, the relation between religious movements and value change, and the revitalization of culture through symbolic crusades.
Religious and Political Goals and Movement Structure

In order to apply social science to a primarily descriptive literature, I must introduce concepts that clarify the relation between religious and political movements. Thus I introduce two dimensions of social movements used extensively in the literature to generate hypotheses.

The entry of theological conservative movements into conservative politics can be seen as a change in movement goals from participation orientation (i.e., stressing the gratification of members) and personal transformation to goals of societal manipulation (Turner & Killian 1972: 274–76). Drawing on Zald & Ash (1966), Curtis & Zurcher (1974) introduce a similar distinction. One category of movements has expressive, diffuse goals and attracts members through offering solidary incentives such as friendship and status. Another type of organization has instrumental, specific goals of accomplishing tasks separate from the personal needs of members. Curtis & Zurcher then add the distinction between exclusive movements, which screen and discipline members, and inclusive movements, which do not.

Table 1 shows the different types of religious and political movements. The fundamentalists of the 1920s and 1930s were expressive-exclusive (cell 1); they pursued largely personal goals and sharply distinguished themselves from other religious groups. As a branch of fundamentalism evolved into Christian anti-communism, it developed greater political involvement and more instrumental goals (moving from cell 1 toward cell 2). Christian anti-communism, like fundamentalism, continued to select an exclusive membership, uphold a narrow, sectarian fundamentalism, and relentlessly criticize liberal Protestants. Thus membership continued to be exclusive as the movement shifted from expressive goals to the instrumental goals of the Goldwater right of the 1960s (Jorstad 1970: 127–42; Streiker & Strober 1972: 110–13).

Neo-evangelicals like Graham sharply distinguished themselves from sectarian fundamentalism. Neo-evangelicals are inclusive—in religious terminology, they are ecumenical, encouraging interdenominational alliances as discussed at an important conference in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1974. Neo-evangelicals usually retain membership in a variety of churches rather

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than forming a new sect (Marty 1976: 95–105; Rifkin & Howard 1979: 165–79, Stark & Glock 1968). The neo-evangelicals also disagree with the fundamentalists along the expressive-instrumental dimension. In contrast to the social unconcern of the fundamentalists, neo-evangelicals argue that Christians ought to improve society, although personal salvation is still the major priority (cell 5). In most cases, social concern has led to positions that are inclusive and moderately conservative rather than exclusive and extremist. Graham, like Nixon, attempted to speak for the silent majority (Streiker & Strober 1972: 36–57, 114–123).

Similar typologies of social movements have been fruitfully used to develop hypotheses about movement change and survival. Curtis & Zurcher (1974) and Zald & Ash (1966) argue that expressive-exclusive movements are likely to be homogeneous, to have a directing leadership style, to face a hostile environment, to insulate members from that environment, to be concerned with doctrinal purity, and to suffer schisms. Expressive movements are also more likely to survive and have more stable goals than instrumental movements, which cease functioning or change goals drastically if the movement succeeds or fails. This suggests that conservative Protestantism, an expressive movement, can survive hostile climates and periodically spawn political campaigns. On the contrary, if left-wing movements like the anti-war movement maintain instrumental goals around single issues, they will become extinct more easily.

**Value Change and Revitalization**

Research on theologically conservative movements can also illuminate theories about movements and value changes. Smelser (1963: 173) cautions us that many religious movements do not involve value change. For example, evangelistic activity that focuses on new ways to convert individuals but does not change the doctrine of established churches can be classified as a fad rather than a value oriented movement. However, value change does accompany some religious movements, especially those (e.g. millenarian movements) that advocate basic changes in politics or society, form distinctive sects or utopian communities to enact new values, and promise imminent and drastic changes.

The intricacies of the world view of millenarian Protestantism must be further explored through field work and in-depth interviews (Lofland 1966). Such work could investigate how different millenarian beliefs influence political and social involvements.

Conservative Protestants believe that passages in the Book of Revelations are concrete predictions that should guide thought and action. Conservative Protestants believe that earthly conditions will steadily worsen, that the Antichrist will recruit followers, and that a seven year “tribulation” of suffering
and chaos will end with the climactic battle of Armageddon, which Christ’s forces will win. Then Christ will inaugurate the “millenium,” a thousand year reign of virtue and prosperity on earth.

In the 20th century, conservative Protestants have generally been premillennial, believing that Christ will appear before the utopian millenium. This differs from liberal denominations, who have generally held postmillennial views. Postmillenialists argue that the spread of the Church and the improvement of worldly conditions during the millenium will preceed Christ’s appearance on earth. The postmillennial orientation has often motivated Christian involvement in social reform.

Different conservative, premillennial theologies greatly influence political views among conservative Protestants. For example, the Christian anti-communists were dispensationalists, who argued that Christ would appear before the tribulation and would carry the faithful to heaven (the “rapture”). Thus, Christ would save His followers from the calamities of the tribulation, which included the Armageddon of nuclear warfare. Christian anti-communists argued that the saved should not fear nuclear weapons, which were part of God’s plan.

The study of 20th century millenarian Protestantism could be enriched by application of theories about revitalization movements. The concept of the revitalization movement (Wallace 1956; Barber 1941; Worsley 1968) was originally used to explain millenarian movements among 19th century native Americans and Melanesians. Both 19th and 20th century revitalization movements began with the sentiment that central cultural patterns had been lost. The belief spread that the world was being overcome by evil, but that a divinity would soon appear to bring prosperity and realize traditional values. Adherents of the revitalization movement were urged to engage in purification rituals, expressing their faith in the divinity and praying for its appearance.

Thus I suggest that millenarian Protestantism can be considered a revitalization movement (cf McLoughlin 1978: 213). This analysis leads to two important research topics. First, the literature on revitalization movements suggests that these movements provide resources, organization, and symbols that can be used in political movements. In the 19th century, revitalization movements produced nationalistic rebellion; today, the politicization is likely to be circumscribed by the traditions of civil religion in the United States. Bellah (1975) discusses how US political institutions are sanctioned by long-standing religious beliefs, such as seeing government as a covenant and believing that Americans are a people chosen by God. The traditions of civil religion may be reinterpreted by conservative social movements (Bellah 1975: ix, 143–44; Marty 1976: 183–200; Streiker & Strober 1972: 171–76; S. A. Mueller, University of Akron, in preparation).

Second, studies of rituals of purity and faith in 19th century revitalization
movements suggest that symbolic politics is also important in contemporary millenarian movements. Contemporary millenarian Protestants contrast themselves to nonbelievers and sinners, such as homosexuals, feminists, and Congressional representatives with “immoral” voting records. The symbolic system of millenarian Protestants also defines Jews as an outgroup, despite Falwell’s criticism of blatant anti-Semitism and the pro-Israel foreign policy of much of the political right wing.

The outgroups in the millenarian belief system may become the targets of symbolic crusades (Streiker & Strober 1972: 110). The National Association of Evangelicals has taken stands against homosexuality and sexual immorality. Another example of a symbolic crusade is the campaign against pornography, definitively analyzed by Zurcher & Kirkpatrick (1976). In anticensorship crusades, participants believe that the United States has morally disintegrated, evidenced by hippies, sex on television, crime, homosexuality, and secularism. These concerns become symbolized by pornography. Breasted’s (1970: 75–76) study of campaigns against sex education noted the influence of religious leaders from Hargis’s Christian Anti-Communist Crusade. The protests against school textbooks in Kanawha County, Tennessee, drew significant support and leadership from fundamentalist churches. The major complaint against the books was that they reflected secular humanism rather than the cultural fundamentalism of the community (Page & Clelland 1978: 271–74). Studies generally indicate that participants in symbolic moral crusades tend to be religious, rural, old, and uneducated (Zurcher & Kirkpatrick 1976: 236–79; Gallup Organization 1981; Hadden & Swann 1981: 46–67).

5. THE NEW RIGHT AS A GENERAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT: ALLIANCES, THEMES, AND LEADERSHIP NETWORKS

In the previous sections, I detailed an array of diverse conservative movements. Partisans on the right (Viguerie 1980), as well as some of their liberal antagonists, have portrayed these movements as a unified “new right” and have described it as a well-organized and well-financed conspiracy (McIntyre 1979). Social science concepts allow us to study the actual degree of unity in the new right.

Blumer (1939) and Turner & Killian (1972: 281–84) discuss the concept of a general movement, which consists of a number of social movements sharing similar ideologies and goals. Although most general movements such as liberal humanitarianism and youth movements (Turner 1969) do not develop a formally unified organization, we introduce the term general social movement when such unifying organizations do evolve. In recent years, new-right
leaders have arisen, claiming to speak for a variety of single-issue conservative movements. To what extent are the single-issue conservative movements part of a general social movement? Some writers have stressed that countermovements (Mottl 1980: 622) and conservative movements (Rogin 1967) focus on single issues. What are the connections among these single-issue movements? I first examine the unity among social conservatives, and then consider the unity between social and political-economic conservatives.

As we have seen, socially conservative movements (such as the right-to-life, Stop-ERA, and anti-busing movements, the symbolic crusade against pornography, and conservative Protestantism) have disproportionate support among intolerant constituencies (those of low SES, the elderly, and residents of the South and/or rural areas). Attempting to find a majority rather than marginality, socially conservative movements have sought to extend this constituency. Movements have articulated racial backlash in ways acceptable to the nonbigoted; they have also taken stands upholding family preservation and evangelical Protestantism. Thus the unity among socially conservative movements depends upon linking backlash and particularly the anti-busing movement with religious and pro-family themes.

Some evidence suggests linkages between anti-busing movements and moralistic defense of the family. Participants in anti-busing movements strongly approve the ideal that wives should not work but rather should care for children (Rubin 1972: 62; Mottl 1980: 628). The United School Parents, an anti-busing group in Richmond, California, also opposed sex education (Kirp et al 1979). Opposition to busing correlated with opposition to premarital sex (Kelley 1974). Backlash correlated with conventional religious beliefs and traditional values of American culture (McConahay & Hough 1976).

What are the interrelations between movements of political-economic conservativism and social and religious conservatism? Political-economic conservatism, particularly the praise of business success, has had a long association with conservative Protestantism (Rifkin & Howard 1979). The career of Richard de Vos, a conservative Protestant who founded the Amway home products company, exemplifies the linkages between evangelism and direct sales techniques. A proliferation of Christian businessmen’s groups (Quebedeaux 1978: 71–73) formulate religious support for the work ethic, legitimate differences in wealth, and spread theologies similar to Dwight Moody’s Gospel of Wealth. Rev. Robert Schuller’s injunctions to “never believe in never” could be compared to earlier positive thinking movements (Meyer 1965).

However, support for economic conservatism and praise of markets and self-interest may be inconsistent with family preservation and anti-feminism (Hunter 1981). For example, participants in the anti-ERA movement tend to be housewives (Mueller & Dimieri 1980; Arrington & Kyle 1978: 673) who might prefer their role in the home to the limited success they could achieve.
in the labor market. Perhaps this pro-family orientation leads to a general suspicion of market rationality and the individualistic behavior necessary for job advancement (Kanter 1977: 69–103). Nonworking women may be resentful of feminists, who may represent the achievement-oriented, upper-middle-class career woman. Nonworking women may also oppose nontherapeutic abortions, which might represent the sinister triumph of career convenience over family, of selfishness over human relationships.

Conservative movements are also linked in formal organizational structures and leadership networks that have been termed the “new right.” As a general social movement the new right includes such groups as the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (headed by Paul Weyrich), which supplies advice and assistance in local campaigns; the National Conservative Political Action Committee (chaired by Terry Dolan), which raises funds for “independent expenditure campaigns” not controlled by candidates for office; the Conservative Caucus (founded by Howard Phillips), which coordinates interest groups within a Congressional constituency; and the Richard A. Viguerie Company, which uses computer generated letters to raise money for conservative causes. Fundraising by these groups in 1977 alone gleaned around $28 million (Crawford 1980: 8–76; McIntyre 1979: 62–87; Viguerie 1980: 55–125). The new right is a general social movement whose leaders link single-issue campaigns with consistent conservative ideology—free markets, anti-communism, and social conservatism. This leadership is more committed than the rank and file to accomplishing right-wing goals. This is in accord with the findings of Zald & Ash (1966: 339), who argue that contrary to Michels’s “iron law of oligarchy,” centralization in a movement can produce more, not less radicalism. The new right emphasizes that it is more militant than big business conservatives, neo-conservative intellectuals, and the Republican Party establishment.

Although the new-right leadership has strong and direct ties to some single-issue groups like Stop ERA, the National Right to Work Committee, the Moral Majority, and the Committee for Responsible Youth Politics, many conservative groups remain unrelated. Anti-busing movements, as we have seen, are usually controlled locally. New-right leaders have provided occasional symbolic support but have little direct involvement. The principal right-to-life organization, the National Right to Life Committee, is not controlled by the new right. Anti-abortion presidential candidate Ellen McCormack favored day care, detente, and gun registration; she opposed capital punishment. The new-right leadership has recently organized a number of alternate right-to-life organizations, including the Life Amendment Political Action Committee, the National Pro-Life Political Action Committee, and the American Life Lobby. Similarly, while Viguerie once raised funds for the National Rifle Association, an environmentalist faction in the NRA has led new-right leaders to organize

CONCLUSION

The flourishing research on conservative movements and countermovements in the United States has indicated many directions for future research.

Section 1: Theories about status and politics are an important legacy for sociology. Future research should avoid versions of status-politics theory that claim social movements stem from societal breakdown and irrational mass behavior. Other varieties of status politics theory can sensitize the researcher to the complexities of a group’s response and the intricacies of the symbols of a passing style of life.

Section 2: Much public opinion data exists about the support for conservative movements, such as the right-to-life, Stop-ERA, and anti-busing movements. The key issue is the evolution of social conservatism, which in the past has consisted mainly of bigotry toward minorities and immigrants. Whites have developed a less personalized backlash against the perceived gains of blacks. This backlash is correlated with participation in anti-busing movements and may indicate the spread of social conservatism among upper-SES constituencies. Family preservation and religious fundamentalism provide important motivations for socially conservative movements.

Section 3: While pollsters have carefully studied individual attitudes on conservative issues, more research is needed on the macro level about the environment of conservative movements. Promising current research studies conservative movements in the context of competing movements, conflicting parts of the government, and historical processes of economic and political change. Resource-mobilization theory, which has begun to address these issues, can be combined with the collective-behavior tradition and its emphasis on the evolution of movement goals and the dynamic interaction between movement and countermovement.

Section 4: The recent literature on conservative Protestantism contains an important discussion about the growth of conservative churches. I suggest that the complex relationship between theological and political conservatism can be clarified by propositions about the emergence of inclusive and instrumental movements, by a close examination of different millenarian world views, and by models of revitalization movements.

Section 5: Despite the attempts to create a national leadership that would unify movements of political-economic and social conservatism, many divisions remain. Lobbyists and campaign managers in Washington often conflict with the leaders of single-issue campaigns, who in turn differ significantly from rank and file supporters. While the religious right is tied to
pro-market sentiment, the pro-market advocates may be fundamentally at odds with the pro-family constituency.

The research outlined above seeks to comprehend conservative movements and their appeal, organization, and evolution. One must understand as well as judge, lest superficial polemics result. Studies of conservative movements can broaden our perspectives about how all movements recruit volunteers, overcome privatism to raise public issues, and expouse an ideology that interprets suffering, yet promises hope.

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